The legislative process is too primitive to take account of the scientific and technical intricacies of various public policy choices, too easily manipulated by party members, and not especially well suited to reconciling (as opposed to papering over) conflicting values. The administrative processes of government are susceptible to manipulation by those in power, often without any attention to the merits of competing claims.

Mediated negotiation has recently been used to supplement traditional methods of resolving complex public resource allocation disputes in the United States. Although many of these efforts have apparently been successful, procedural concerns have been raised by a number of analysts. In this paper, we focus on five of these concerns: (1) problems of representation, (2) the difficulties of setting an appropriate agenda, (3) obstacles to joint fact finding, (4) difficulties of binding parties to their commitments, and (5) obstacles to monitoring and enforcing negotiated agreements. Our discussion builds on three cases: a negotiated investment strategy undertaken by the state of Connecticut; a dispute over the siting of a low-income housing project in Forest Hills, New York; and an environmental dispute involving energy production facilities along the Hudson River. These experiences indicate that the difficulties associated with mediation can be overcome with the application of innovative techniques, and the assistance of a skillful and astute mediator.

In duplicate contract bridge, several teams of players at different tables receive identical hands of cards, bid, and then play. Possible outcomes of each game vary considerably since, even though the teams are playing the same hands, they may devise bidcling strategies that are more or less effective than those developed by their counterparts at other tables.

Judges often appoint special masters to help with complex cases. In many of the desegregation cases of the 1970s, for example, special masters were assigned to oversee the development and implementation of court-ordered busing plans. In bankruptcy proceedings, special masters serve as court-appointed executors to preside over the liquidation of holdings. Judges have also appointed special masters to serve as "receivers" of public agencies and to oversee implementation of consent decrees involving reforms at prisons and mental institutions.

Public policy disputes involving comp1e.x scientific issues usually entail conflicts not only over those scientific issues but also over the distribution o gains and losses. The presence o scientific or technical dimensions to a dispute should not be allowed to mask underlying distributional considerations. On the other hand science-intensive disputes require special attention. Merely resolving distributional conflicts without and potentially dangerous results. The usual adversarial approach that characterizes the handling o such disputes by agencies and courts is less than ideal or creating an understanding o scientific evidence or the resolution o scientific differences. A process o mediation already applied in a number o significant cases offers strong promise as a superior approach.

Traditional approaches to resolving coastal resource management disputes in the United States often produce less-than-optimal outcomes. Nonadjudicatory approaches such as policy dialogues and mediation can be more effective. This article presents four case studies of such approaches that have proven successful in resolving coastal resource management disputes in Massachusetts, California, and Oregon. These approaches emphasize consensus-building, are based on face to face discussions between contending stakeholders, and include important roles for planners as negotiators and mediators. The article describes four barriers to more widespread use of less adversarial forms of dispute resolution and suggests ways of overcoming those barriers.

Traditional approaches to the siting of potentially hazardous but regionally necessary facilities are often ineffective and lead to drawn-out legal disputes ultimately satisfactory to none of the parties. Research at MIT over the last decade has indicated five factors that may solve the siting puzzle. Application of these principles do not guarantee that a decision will not be disputed but may enhance the possibility of a wise and durable agreement.

Resource allocation decisions in the public sector are typically made by legislative and administrative bodies. All too often, these methods of decision making fail to produce wise and efficient responses to conflicting needs and interests and courts are asked to review or to overturn these decisions Recent experiments with medi ated negotiation — face-to-face negotiation involving teams representing key stake- holding interests and an impartial mediator — indicate that it might be possi ble to supplement traditional resource allo cation processes in a manner likely to yield an informed consensus Three cases have been selected to illustrate the procedures and opportunities involved

Traditional administrative, legislative and judicial processes often fail to resolve public sector disputes effectively. This article examines mediated negotiation as one of several possible "alternative dispute resolution" processes. Based on reflections on past mediation efforts, the authors propose a list of generic steps to guide future efforts. In addition, they examine six special process innovations applied in a recent public sector negotiation in Malden, Massachusetts. The authors identify the potential advantages and disadvantages of each innovation, and conclude by describing the types of public sector disputes in which mediated negotiation and the process innovations might be most useful.

Dealing with the topic of negotiation, this issue discusses experimental social psychological studies on negotiating behavior, the ways that power is used in negotiation, consequences and considerations involved in choosing a negotiating strategy, mediation, the cognitive constraints to negotiation, and similarities and differences between negotiation in public and private sectors. 

Three case studies of mediated negotiation in the public sector are summarized. Special attention is given to the roles played by the mediators in these cases, the difficulties of ensuring adequate representation of all stakeholders, and the problems of protecting the “public interest.” Criteria for evaluating mediated negotiation as a supplement to traditional legislative, administrative, and judicial means of resolving resource allocation disputes are offered. The techniques of labor mediation and mediation in international disputes are compared to see which are more appropriate for use in public sector resource allocation disputes.

Five years ago, in the second issue of the EIA Review, I suggested that it was time to shift our attention from impact assessment to strategies for resolving environmental disputes. In Iris state-of-the-art summary in that same October 1978 issue, David O'Connor reviewed the first twenty environmental mediation efforts in the United States and concluded that "mediation by neutral parties has played a significant role in resolving a number of important and controversial environmental disputes."

Environmental mediation is being practiced in many parts of the United States. Although still sparse, mediation experience is accumulating rapidly. Strong professional and interpersonal networks are aiding the rapid development of the field.3 Consensus building" and conflict management techniques dominate the environmental dispute resolution field, but formal mediation is employed in a growing number of instances.

For participation advocates, citizen involvement in government decision making is synonymous with:(1) democratization of resource allocation choices,(2) decentralization of service systems management,(3) deprofessionalization of bureaucratic judgments that affect the lives of residents, and (4) dmystification of design and investment decisions (Alinsky, 1946; Illich, 1970; Kotier, 1969).

The practice of environmental impact assessment (EIA) is shaped in large part by the values and beliefs of the professionals involved. Values-or nonobjective personal judgments of merit or worth influence the choices made at all junctures of an impact assessment. Personal or nonobjective considerations affect outcomes more than is usually recognized.

Almost every effort to protect or enhance environmental quality is perceived as a challenge, at least at the outset, by groups or individuals whose economic self-interest-or political beliefs-are threatened. 1 Similarly, almost every attempt to promote economic development or technological innovation is viewed as a potential insult to the quality of the natural environment or a threat to the delicate "ecological balance" upon which we all depend.2 Environmental and developmental interests, if the shorthand is permissible, are locked in a fierce and widening battle.

In 1977, when the accumulation of well-intentioned regulations made it difficult to site a liquified natural gas (LNG) facility in California, the legislature, with the full support of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., passed a law, Senate Bill 1081 (Chapter 855, Statutes of 1977), that said, in effect, "not withstanding any previously enacted legislation or regulatory requirements, California will designate an LNG terminal site within a year." The state's attempt to preempt local regulatory authority, to say nothing of the legislature's willingness to circumvent its own facility siting, coastal protection, and environmental impact assessment laws, seems to leave failed. This case study describes the circumstances leading up to the enactment of S.B. 1081 and analyzes tile dangers associated with preemptive legislation. Had California confronted the real weaknesses in its energy facility siting process, the state could have identified positive steps that" would have accelerated site ~selection without triggering the staunch opposition that now threatens indefinite delay.