Publications

Resource allocation decisions in the public sector are typically made by legislative and administrative bodies. All too often, these methods of decision making fail to produce wise and efficient responses to conflicting needs and interests and courts are asked to review or to overturn these decisions Recent experiments with medi ated negotiation — face-to-face negotiation involving teams representing key stake- holding interests and an impartial mediator — indicate that it might be possi ble to supplement traditional resource allo cation processes in a manner likely to yield an informed consensus Three cases have been selected to illustrate the procedures and opportunities involved

Traditional administrative, legislative and judicial processes often fail to resolve public sector disputes effectively. This article examines mediated negotiation as one of several possible "alternative dispute resolution" processes. Based on reflections on past mediation efforts, the authors propose a list of generic steps to guide future efforts. In addition, they examine six special process innovations applied in a recent public sector negotiation in Malden, Massachusetts. The authors identify the potential advantages and disadvantages of each innovation, and conclude by describing the types of public sector disputes in which mediated negotiation and the process innovations might be most useful.

Dealing with the topic of negotiation, this issue discusses experimental social psychological studies on negotiating behavior, the ways that power is used in negotiation, consequences and considerations involved in choosing a negotiating strategy, mediation, the cognitive constraints to negotiation, and similarities and differences between negotiation in public and private sectors. 

Three case studies of mediated negotiation in the public sector are summarized. Special attention is given to the roles played by the mediators in these cases, the difficulties of ensuring adequate representation of all stakeholders, and the problems of protecting the “public interest.” Criteria for evaluating mediated negotiation as a supplement to traditional legislative, administrative, and judicial means of resolving resource allocation disputes are offered. The techniques of labor mediation and mediation in international disputes are compared to see which are more appropriate for use in public sector resource allocation disputes.

Five years ago, in the second issue of the EIA Review, I suggested that it was time to shift our attention from impact assessment to strategies for resolving environmental disputes. In Iris state-of-the-art summary in that same October 1978 issue, David O'Connor reviewed the first twenty environmental mediation efforts in the United States and concluded that "mediation by neutral parties has played a significant role in resolving a number of important and controversial environmental disputes."

Environmental mediation is being practiced in many parts of the United States. Although still sparse, mediation experience is accumulating rapidly. Strong professional and interpersonal networks are aiding the rapid development of the field.3 Consensus building" and conflict management techniques dominate the environmental dispute resolution field, but formal mediation is employed in a growing number of instances.

For participation advocates, citizen involvement in government decision making is synonymous with:(1) democratization of resource allocation choices,(2) decentralization of service systems management,(3) deprofessionalization of bureaucratic judgments that affect the lives of residents, and (4) dmystification of design and investment decisions (Alinsky, 1946; Illich, 1970; Kotier, 1969).

The practice of environmental impact assessment (EIA) is shaped in large part by the values and beliefs of the professionals involved. Values-or nonobjective personal judgments of merit or worth influence the choices made at all junctures of an impact assessment. Personal or nonobjective considerations affect outcomes more than is usually recognized.

In 1977, when the accumulation of well-intentioned regulations made it difficult to site a liquified natural gas (LNG) facility in California, the legislature, with the full support of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., passed a law, Senate Bill 1081 (Chapter 855, Statutes of 1977), that said, in effect, "not withstanding any previously enacted legislation or regulatory requirements, California will designate an LNG terminal site within a year." The state's attempt to preempt local regulatory authority, to say nothing of the legislature's willingness to circumvent its own facility siting, coastal protection, and environmental impact assessment laws, seems to leave failed. This case study describes the circumstances leading up to the enactment of S.B. 1081 and analyzes tile dangers associated with preemptive legislation. Had California confronted the real weaknesses in its energy facility siting process, the state could have identified positive steps that" would have accelerated site ~selection without triggering the staunch opposition that now threatens indefinite delay.

Almost every effort to protect or enhance environmental quality is perceived as a challenge, at least at the outset, by groups or individuals whose economic self-interest-or political beliefs-are threatened. 1 Similarly, almost every attempt to promote economic development or technological innovation is viewed as a potential insult to the quality of the natural environment or a threat to the delicate "ecological balance" upon which we all depend.2 Environmental and developmental interests, if the shorthand is permissible, are locked in a fierce and widening battle.